1609/4731.

LETTER

TO A

MINISTER OF STATE,

ON THE

CONNECTION BETWEEN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

OF THE

FRENCH REPUBLIC,

AND THE

SYSTEM OF ITS REVOLUTION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF

MALLET DU PAN.

Ce ſont là les Heros qui gouvernent la terre;
Il ſont en ſe jouant et la paix et la guerre;.
Du ſein des voluptés ils nous doment des fers.
A quels maîtres, grand Dieux! livrez-vous l'univers?

VOLTAIRE'S TRIUMVIRATE.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Letter has been imputed to the pen of M. MALLET DU PAN, a writer diſtinguiſhed for the depth of his knowledge, the juſtice of his views, and the acuteneſs of his obſervations, on all ſubjects connected with the French Revolution; and the reſult of the enquiries which the Tranſlator has made, tends to eſtabliſh the juſtice of the imputation. Great as the celebrity of the Author of the Letter unqueſtionably is, it ſtill can add nothing to the importance of its contents. The expoſition which it exhibits of the genius and principles of the French Revolution, and of the views and deſigns of the preſent Government of France, on the grand queſtion of Peace, is ſuch as betrays an intimate acquaintance with the ſubject, and becomes highly intereſting, at this critical juncture, to all the Princes and to all the People of Europe. In introducing theſe pages to the notice of a Britiſh public, the Tranſlator has been actuated by no views of intereſt, by no ſpirit of party; but by an earneſt deſire to call the ſerious attention of his countrymen to a queſtion which involves in its conſequences every thing that is dear to the Patriot, the Citizen, and the Man. If the French ſhould perſiſt in the views here imputed to their Government, and, it is feared, with too much reaſon and truth, every honeſt

man in the kingdom muſt henceforth join heart and hand, in repelling a ſyſtem more alarming in its principles, more deſtructive in its effects, than any which the annals of civilized nations exhibit to the world. The contentions of party, the ſtruggles for power, the dictates of ambition, the turbulence of envy, all differences, political and religious, all animoſity, public and private, muſt yield to the immediate preſſure of dangers that threaten, not merely our national, but our individual, exiſtence. At a moment when life and property are expoſed to imminent hazard, none but the ideot or the madman would, for an inſtant, abandon their defence to maintain a conteſt for objects of inferior import.

The anſwer to Mr. HAMMOND's propoſitions for Peace will ſupply a ſtandard for appreciating the juſtice of the following obſervations; and will enable the public to aſcertain how far the French have relinquiſhed the pernicious ſyſtem of policy which they are there ſtated to entertain. In the mean time, it is alike the intereſt and the duty of every man who has a regard for his country, to conſider attentively the principles and views aſcribed to its enemies, and, diveſting himſelf of all prejudices but thoſe which reſult from a laudable attachment to the ſoil that gave him birth, to prepare his mind for a *due* exerciſe of pure *Britiſh* judgment, and for a *proper* diſplay of true *Britiſh* ſpirit.

LETTER

TO A

MINISTER OF STATE.

B..... March 1, 1797.

SIR,

IT is a misfortune, which, perhaps, admits of no remedy, that the Cabinets of Princes, and the public, have never obſerved the force and effects of the French Revolution, except through the *accidental* circumſtances which it has produced; and that, by inceſſantly changing their opinions with occurrences as they ariſe, they have always fixed their attention on fugitive or perſonal modifications.

Every thing holds together, every thing is connected, by an indiſſoluble chain, in this vaſt enterprize of ruin, which, after having ſwallowed up Ancient France, has already extended the limits of her territory; and its authors only ſuſpend, from motives of policy, the revolution of thoſe ſtates which they have ſurrounded with

their armies, or enſnared by treaties extorted by terror.

Theſe States haſtened to ſolicit the *mercy* of the Directory, under the name of pacification; and to conceal their fears under the cloak of neutrality. The victories and the immenſe forces of the enemy preſcribed this line of conduct; but how did it happen that the potentates in queſtion did not perceive, that this very motive imperiouſly dictated a reſolution of a nature diametrically oppoſite? If France, in a ſtate of revolution, make one half of Europe lay down their arms, almoſt without a ſtruggle, will ſhe be leſs formidable when ſhe ſhall have enfeebled or deſtroyed the laſt powers that ſtill keep the field?

I appeal to the candour of every reflecting mind. What will then become of the other States in preſence of that diſorganizing oligarchy, fortified with a prodigious encreaſe of territory, ſurrounded by conquered or ſubmiſſive monarchs, by ſhaken or ſubdued ſtates, by terrified tributaries, or impotent foes?

What will become of the French themſelves, confederated, *in appearance*, with Belgians, Batavians, Germans, Lombards, Genoeſe, and Romans, and *in reality* ſubjected, like the Roman Empire of old,

old, to that crowd of barbarians, republicaniſed in the boſom of Maratiſm, and whoſe faction, predominating in the regency of Paris, will certainly act againſt France herſelf, if ever ſhe ſhould attempt to ſhake off the yoke?

The external partiſans of the war, founding the fable of their hopes in its precarious ſucceſſes; the miniſterial flatterers and courtiers, have inceſſantly amuſed the Cabinets with the actual or ſpeedy annihilation of the reſources of the Republic. If there had been any truth in theſe chimerical repreſentations, they would juſtify the neutrality and the treaties of peace to which a number of potentates have looked for their ſafety. France, thus weakened, ceaſing to inſpire the dread of invaſion, of her dictatorial ſpirit, and of her proſelytiſm, would have exhibited only one danger, that of becoming a prey to the great powers who had attacked her territory. Then, the political jealouſy of the ſecond order of States, the legitimacy of their apprehenſions, and the peril to which the balance of power was expoſed, would have authorized them to leave to the belligerent ſovereigns the care of a war by which they alone were deſtined to profit.

But the queſtion is of a very different nature. It involves the independance and integrity not of

France, but of the reſt of Europe. Your Excellence muſt be aware, that the war will decide, not whether Auſtria or Great Britain ſhall be aggrandized, but whether a Republic, founded upon abſtract principles incompatible with the exiſtence of every other ſocial ſyſtem; if a government, which unites to the fury of its dogmatic genius a ſpirit of ambition of which no monarch of France ever offered an example;—if that government, I ſay, remaining more formidable than Louis the Fourteenth was after the peace of Nimeguen, ſhall force, or not, one half of Europe, to ſubmit to its arms, or its plots; to its apoſtles, or to the capitulations which it ſhall pleaſe to impoſe?

If ſuch a ſtate of things had been ſubmitted to the conſideration of Henry the Fourth, Guſtavus Adolphus, or Frederick William, can it be ſuppoſed that he would long have deliberated on the line of conduct which it became him to purſue?

I ſhall now advert to the immediate object of your Excellency's queſtions. I muſt firſt requeſt you to recollect the opinion which I invariably entertained and expreſſed, in other times, with reſpect to the foreign or external policy of the French revolutioniſts. The proofs which I adduced in ſupport of that opinion, whether in point of fact or argument, or indication, were

founded in experience; they appeared to me to explain and characterize that regular ſyſtem, the effects of which the powers of Europe in vain attempt to avert, by means of the ſuperannuated principles of ancient policy; a ſyſtem which they ſuppoſe has changed its object and its nature, becauſe they themſelves have changed their ſentiments and their conduct in their mode of ſecuring themſelves againſt its deſtructive conſequences.

Your Excellence is better acquainted than I am with every thing that relates to what are called the *negociations for peace*. That of Lord Malmeſbury, having been publiſhed officially at London, and broken off from motives, and with forms, of public notoriety, it is needleſs for me to trouble your Excellence with a repetition of circumſtances ſo generally known.

Whatever were the views of the Britiſh Government, the Directory did not take the trouble of throwing the blame upon them; they took upon themſelves the reſponſibility attached to the rupture, with their uſual arrogance and audacity. Since public negociations, regular forms, and the obligation of mutual reſpect, had been eſtabliſhed in Europe, there had never before been

been an inſtance of the ambaſſador of a great power, equally entitled to attention by his perſonal qualities, and his public character, and coming to propoſe peace from a nation that had not loſt a ſingle inch of territory, being treated with ſuch brutal inſolence, and, after having experienced every kind of affront, being driven away, like a ſpy, at twenty-four hours notice.

This is inconteſtibly a new right of nations;—The courtier who is moſt partial to the French revolution, cannot deny that there now exiſts a power which, in its negociations, has introduced the mode which the ſenate of Rome purſued with the little kings of Aſia, and which the eaſtern monarchs obſerve with their tributaries. It is not England alone that ſuſtains this affront, it is all Europe; it is an inſult levelled at all crowned heads, and all the conventions of cuſtom and decorum that have been eternally reſpected. The ſtate that violates theſe with outrage, declares itſelf the ſole arbiter of the reſpect and attention that are due to the ſovereignty of other powers, and proclaims its diſavowal of their titles and their rights; it avers, that all the proceedings hitherto obſerved muſt fall before its own ſupremacy; and that, henceforth, it will regulate its negociations by the caprice of its directors, and

by

by the rule generally obſerved by a ſovereign in a compromiſe with rebels.

Parcere ſubjectis, debellare ſuperbos. Such is the diplomatic code of the French Republic. It no longer leaves Europe a third place; and if it condeſcend to flatter for a moment the paſſions and the jealouſy of certain ſovereigns, it is only from motives of policy, and not from conſiderations of duty. Its principle is general: ſince it avails itſelf of that principle to violate the independance of nations at war, which has hitherto been conſidered as inviolable, let me aſk what reſpect it will pay, in caſe of neceſſity, to thoſe powers to whom it has dictated peace?

Thus while ill-informed and inconſiderate miniſters are endeavouring to convince their ſovereigns of the abſolute identity of the regicide regency of Paris, with the lawful government of the ancient monarchy, that regency gives the lie direct to their aſſertion, by introducing innovations into the whole ſyſtem of negociation, that amount to a ſolemn and methodical attack upon all ſovereignty.

I dare ſay that the MARQUIS DEL CAMPO, and the other humble Deputies, whom Europe ſends

to

to Paris to offer incenſe to the aſſaſſins of kings and deſpoilers of property, and whoſe adulation aſtoniſhes even the Jacobins, prudently omit, in the explanations which they ſend to their reſpective courts, all account of their own ſituation. They take ſpecial care not to expoſe the ſtate of ſervility to which they are reduced, and the acts of baſeneſs which they are condemned to commit, not to conciliate the favour of the chiefs and ſub-chiefs of the regency, of their courtiers, and their creatures—that favour they never will obtain—but to eſcape ignominious affronts, terminated by an order to leave France. They are ſilent on the humility of their countenance, their preſentation, and their ſupplicatory requeſts; they are ſilent on the new etiquette to which they are ſubjected, while they are received with leſs ceremony than was obſerved with a cabinet meſſenger under the old government; they find nothing ſcandalous in having honoured with their preſence the ſacramental commemoration of the moſt atrocious regicide; in having received, in the pomp of their dignity, the imprecations and the oaths of a troop of conſpirators againſt Royalty. But their degradation ſupplies a living leſſon, and a light more brilliant than any which the myſterious jargon of their correſpondence can afford.

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The leſſon which it imparts informs them, that the kind of connection that ſubſiſts between Republican and Regicide France and other governments, is the connection of terror with ſubmiſſion; that the moſt imperious miniſters of the moſt deſpotic monarchs were models of mildneſs and deference to foreign powers, when compared with the five Viziers, who, in one hand, hold the bloody head of a king, while with the other they receive the ſupplicatory petitions of Europe; that a total change has taken place in forms as well as principles; that the rights of nations are to be re-eſtabliſhed, or rather that they are new-modelled, on a Jacobin baſis, and after the taſte of the Directory; that, laſtly, envoys forced, under pain of being conſidered as *ſuſpected* perſons, to aſſociate for the celebration of crimes, to connive at the total failure of that reſpect which is due to themſelves and their ſovereigns, and to ſacrifice all decency, all dignity, all honour to the pitiful attempt to conciliate the good graces of a few leaders of the aſſaſſins of September:—theſe envoys, I ſay, proclaim to Europe that the ancient ſyſtem of her public communications has diſappeared, and that the only alternative which now remains, is to oppoſe the deſpotiſm of the French Republic, or to bend before her in the attitude of interceſſion.

This one revolution, in the line of conduct preſcribed by the Directory to foreign ambaſſadors, leaves no doubt as to the danger which threatens the independence of all ſovereigns. It is eaſy to anticipate the motive of the negociations which can ſubſiſt between them and a new power, who compels them to play a part as inconſiſtent with their dignity and their rights, as with eſtabliſhed cuſtoms.

Certainly, the ultimate object of any negociations, entered into by a power raiſed by crime, ſuſtained by arms, and acknowledged by all the ſtates which ſhe ſubjugates, intimidates, or intends to cajole into a ſupport of her cauſe, will not be to temper or modify the ſplendour of her fortune! She will not voluntarily deſcend from heaven to earth, ſhe will not change her principles, becauſe Europe has been ſo kind as to acknowledge their legitimacy; ſhe will not become moderate and juſt, becauſe ſhe will have acquired, by treaties, ſigned by compulſion, the power of being otherwiſe, and the certainty of impunity.

It is true, indeed, that the orators in the two councils, and the authors of the Directorial manifeſtoes, cite the *clemency* of the Republic; it is alſo

alſo true, that ſome political *Philintes* promiſe us, that when Europe ſhall fall upon her knees, ſhe will be received with dignity and reconducted to her place; but I doubt whether your Excellence would be tempted to truſt to that *clemency*, that equity, that future urbanity.

The political deſigns of ſuch a government will correſpond with its relative poſition; the greater influence it will have acquired, whether by opinion, by fear, by the aſcendancy which it will have eſtabliſhed over other ſtates, or laſtly, by an extenſion of territory, the leſs reaſon will Europe undoubtedly have to expect to ſee her ambition lowered.

What reaſon predicted, experience has proved. Your Excellence has before you the treaties concluded with the Republic, or impoſed by her government. You know the terms on which ſhe is willing to lay down her arms, and the projects to the execution of which ſhe attaches the condition of peace. What I have the honour to offer to your Excellence, will therefore be nothing more than a mere recapitulation; it will exhibit, not a theory of the imagination, but a gazette of the preſent time.

The ſyſtem of ſeparate pacifications has been aſcribed to the ABBE SYEYES; it is conformable to his genius; this fundamental principle, which is taken from the Romans, and has been purſued by all powers infected with a ſpirit of conqueſt, has ſtood againſt events, misfortunes, dangers, party-diſſentions, and all the variations that circumſtances have occaſionally produced.

The firſt links of the European coalition being once broken, the French found, in the fractures, the means of daily enlarging the breach, and every child in the Republic now perceives that, after ſeveral conſiderable ſtates have been detached from the league, one by one, the queſtion is ſimplified. Thoſe ſtates, pacified, neutralized, or ſubjected, no longer having any principle of adherence among themſelves, their actual relation with the laſt belligerent powers being, by the very act of their ſeparation, more nearly allied to enmity than harmony, it is clear, that they would not be able to interpoſe any obſtacle to the completion of the project of the Directory, for the concluſion of ſeparate treaties, on which the termination of the war ultimately depends; nor yet to influence their nature or their proviſions.

Pruſſia

Pruſſia having ſerved to detach from the league a part of the Empire; Spain, to detach from it a part of Italy; nothing remained but to effect the diſunion of the Emperor from England, to render Ruſſia indifferent to the fate of both, and to give up Portugal to Spain. The neutral ſtates, from their ſituation with regard to the territories invaded or occupied by the French armies, having it in their power to excite ſome apprehenſions, if ever they ſhould be led to reſent the inſolence and vexations to which they are expoſed, the government boldly determined to treat them as conquered countries.

At this period of general diſunion, the Directorial ambition found its road ready marked out. There could be no heſitation in chuſing between a general peace with the Emperor, England, and Portugal; and a ſeparate peace with each of the three powers; nor did the Directory heſitate a minute, notwithſtanding the diſaſters which brought back their armies to the banks of the Rhine, and the misfortunes which they dreaded in Italy.

The whole weight of danger and of loſs falling upon the Emperor, it was propoſed to attack the fidelity of that prince to his engagements, at firſt by open force, and afterwards by artifice. When

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it was determined to poſtpone the invaſion of Auſtria by the Tyrol and Bavaria, pacificatory propoſitions were renewed; an artful Iriſhman was diſpatched to Vienna, to open Pandora's box, enveloped in an offer of an armiſtice; General Clarke had orders to repeat thoſe offers of conceſſions and compenſations, which had been frequently propoſed before by indirect agents.

Theſe propoſitions are no longer a myſtery; they were not ſo when CHARLES LACROIX thought proper to communicate them to LORD MALMESBURY; they had a double object—to detach the Emperor from England, and, in the indemnity offered to the Houſe of Auſtria, to lay the train for a conflagration in Germany, and the baſis of a complete ſubverſion of the general ſyſtem of Europe, the balance of power, and the Germanic conſtitution*.

The Teleſcope of the French government has never, for a moment, been diverted from theſe three points of view, ſince the year 1794. According to this plan, the Republic retained the Ne-

* This deſtructive artifice of the French Government has been properly noticed by Mr. GIFFORD, in his anſwer to Mr. ERSKINE'S "View of the Cauſes and Conſequences of the preſent War with France."

therlands,

therlands, the principality of Liege, the towns on the Meuſe, and Dutch Flanders; ſhe reſtored to the Emperor all Lombardy, leaving at his ſide a Jacobin Republic, and fifty leagues of country in a confirmed ſtate of revolution, guaranteed by France; ſhe indemnified him for the loſs of the Low Countries, by uſurpations and ſecularizations in Germany. The three Eccleſiaſtical States were thrown, as a prize, into this vaſt lottery of plunder. The conſequences which the Directory hoped to derive from ſuch a ſubverſion of the fundamental laws of Europe; of the ſacred rights of its principal members; of the proportions and intereſts which have exiſted for two centuries and a half, between the different parts of the Germanic Union, cannot eſcape the attention of your Excellence.—To render the Chief of the Empire the executor of, and principal participator in, this ingenious ſyſtem of ſpoliation—to engage in it ſeveral princes of the Empire; to put into the wheel electoral crowns, and eccleſiaſtical principalities, was to eſtabliſh the principle of a combuſtion worſe than that which was extinguiſhed by the peace of Weſtphalia; it was to overturn the whole code of the public law of Europe.

Such was the plan, ſuch is ſtill the plan, of that Regency, whoſe *good faith* is celebrated by the envoys of foreign powers now reſident at Paris.

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The refuſal of the court of Vienna has ſuſpended the execution of theſe mighty projects; but they remain invariably fixed at the office of the Luxembourg. They purpoſe, and they hope to accompliſh them, either by conſtraining the Emperor to conclude a peace upon worſe conditions, or by perſuading Pruſſia, and thoſe ſtates of the Empire which follow her fortune, to enter into an alliance with France.

The laſt defeats of the Auſtrians on the Adige, the reduction of Mantua, and the probable conſequences of theſe events, have produced a change in the baſes of a ſeparate pacification with the Emperor. Italy becomes the patrimony of France, who, long uncertain of her ability to retain the Milaneſe, ſtill conſidered it, in the month of December laſt, as an equivalent in the balance of reſtitutions. While the French *municipalized* Modena and Romagna, under the appellation of the *Ciſpadane Republic*, they moderated the revolutionary appetites of the Marats of Lombardy; they ſuſpended their activity; they only permitted them to act as deſpoilers, as officers of fortune, entruſted with the government of the country, that is to ſay, with the power of exhauſting its reſources.

Now CHARLES LACROIX has juſt written to inform the Lombards, that their juſt impatience ſhall

ſhall be ſatisfied, and that they ſhall immediately be admitted to a participation of the bleſſings of *Ciſpadane* Republicaniſm.

Unleſs victory ſpeedily opens for the Auſtrians a road to the Milaneſe, that ſuperb country will be, definitively, ſwallowed up in the revolutionary gulph: if, on the contrary, the Court of Vienna, threatened in its ſouthern provinces by a conqueror, who allows no interval of repoſe, and whoſe aſcendancy has never varied, ſhould yield to a deſire for peace, it may, beforehand, eraſe its Italian ſtates from the liſt of its poſſeſſions.

Enabled to preſcribe laws to Trieſte and to Naples, as they have already done to Nice, the Directory mean to divide their conqueſts into three parts; the firſt will comprehend ſuch diſtricts as they wiſh to add to their territory on the frontiers of Piedmont and on the river of Genoa; and, perhaps, will include the city of Genoa itſelf, which is haraſſed by inceſſant inſults and requiſitions; is thrown into a ſtate of internal convulſion; has juſt been compelled to advance a new forced loan of four millions Tournois, and to diſarm the inhabitants on the banks of the two rivers, which the different corps of the French army traverſe with their cannon, and drums beating;

ing; and which has no more political exiſtence than Geneva.

The ſecond diviſion will include the republicanized ſtates; that is to ſay, Lombardy, Mantua, Modena, Bologna, and Romagna, from the Appenines to the Adriatic Gulph. This revolutionary domain will not terminate there; the countries of Bergamo, Breſcia, and the Swiſs Bailiwicks beyond the Alps, will be conſidered as eſſential appendages to it. Buonaparte has taken poſſeſſion of the two Venetian provinces juſt mentioned; and he governs them nearly in the ſame manner as the Milaneſe. As to the Swiſs Bailiwicks, the ſpirit of their inhabitants becomes more and more perverted every day. The French have ſeized the Lake of Lugano, where they haraſs the governors, and treat them as criminal neighbours. Eight days ago General Kilmaine, the commandant of Milan, wrote to the Bailiff of Lugano a dictatorial letter, in the ſtyle of a chief of the Talpachi, and ending with theſe words:—*I have neither eſteem nor friendſhip for you.*

In the third diviſion, two Princes and a Republic will remain, to whom the French will condeſcend to leave, proviſionally, a ſhadow of ſovereignty: the Kings of Naples and Sardinia, and

and the Republic of Venice, will be three vaſſals, having for a tangent the new Italic Republic, charged to exerciſe beyond the Alps, and in the name of the revolutionary metropolis, the police of the rights of man, and the ſovereignty of the people. Theſe ſtates will moreover be expoſed to the cenſure, inſpection, and authority of *fraternal* Envoys, Agents, and Conſuls well choſen, maintaining a correſpondence with the fire-brands of the Italic Republic, and whoſe province it will be to regulate the government of theſe three powers, until ſuch time as the revolutionary fire ſhall have conſumed them. This cataſtrophe is accelerated by means of a regular plan: ſome commotions have juſt appeared, and a plot has juſt been diſcovered, at Turin: the French are employed in the ſuſcitation of tumults in different diſtricts of Piedmont; Naples is ſtill nearer to her ruin: there are now, thanks to French intrigues, more moral than natural volcanoes on her territory.

The fate of the Grand Duke of Tuſcany is ſtill undetermined; he is a kind of hoſtage, whoſe fate depends on that of his family: he keeps the vultures off, at preſent, by tributes.

As to the Pope, BUONAPARTE has granted him one of thoſe capitulations which it now

pleaſes the courteſy of Europe to call *Treaties of Peace*. He has ruined the Pontiff; he has taken from him one half of his dominions, ſecured his beſt harbour, and will make himſelf maſter of the remaining part of his territory, if the Archduke Charles will allow him an opportunity.—The Pope is indebted to the preſence of that valiant Prince for the ſafety of his capital, and the retreat of the revolutionary conqueror.

So much for the South of Europe. Will the French Jacobins adopt a more moderate ſyſtem of policy in the North? Your Excellence will, I think, admit that ſuch moderation can only reſult from the impotence of theſe general plunderers.

Here they have meaſured the difficulties they have to ſurmount; and, for want of armies as rapid in their motions, and as ſucceſsful as thoſe of Buonaparte, they have called in the aid of hypocriſy, policy, and temporiſing meaſures.

Germany united, governed with firmneſs, and defended by reſpectable armies, would have counter-balanced the power of the Republic; the Germanic Monarchies would have preſented a formidable reſiſtance to the arms, the intrigues,

and

and the opinions of the French. How was this obſtacle to be removed? war alone being inſufficient for the purpoſe, recourſe was had to diſſolvents. Having ſucceeded in dividing the empire, the Directory and their councils ſaw, in the riſing ſchiſm between Auſtria and Pruſſia, the certain principle of the ruin of Germany. Maſters of all its approaches, of the Netherlands, the Meuſe, the left bank of the Rhine, and laſtly, of all Holland, from the ſimilitude of its ſyſtem and its fate, they augment their own force by the very means by which they diminiſh that of the Germanic body and its natural allies; and while the French Republic thus extends her indiviſible territory, ſhe diſunites her neighbours, and deprives them of the ſhield of concord, the only one which ſhe dreaded, and the only one which could enſure their ſafety.

The reſtitution of a few fragments of conquered country between the Meuſe and the Rhine, is now a matter of very little conſequence to her; ſhe will only conteſt ſuch miſerable intereſts as far as they affect the fundamental principle of ſubverting Germany *by means of its own conduct*, and of then planting the tree of *Equality* on its ruins.

Nothing

Nothing, then, is more indifferent, at this juncture, than theſe little geographical debates, theſe parcels of territory, to which ſo much importance is attached. France might reſtore what ſhe has diſmembered from the empire on the left bank of the Rhine, and ſtill have gained her end.

But ſhe has long given up the idea of reſtoring even theſe territories, purely and ſimply; if ſhe delayed their incorporation, it was becauſe ſhe conſidered them either as an object of compenſation to ſanction the retention of more important conqueſts, or as lots to divide among the powers whoſe ambition ſhould ſerve to promote a general conflagration in Germany.

The conqueſt of Italy will decide the fate of the Rhine. The Emperor is, at this moment, conſidered at Paris as definitively deſpoiled both of Belgium and Lombardy, and as being at the point of laying down his arms. If this conjecture ſhould be verified, the Directory will proportion their indulgence to the motives which ſhall have impelled the Court of Vienna to ſubmiſſion. The more imperious thoſe motives are, the greater will be the ſacrifice exacted; Belgium and Lombardy, once loſt, will no longer require compenſation, and then, I have no doubt, but that the ſyſtem

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of extending the limits of the Republic to the Rhine, that ſyſtem which has been the conſtant object of the Jacobins, that ſyſtem which has never been abandoned, will be rigidly enforced.

If, on the contrary, the Emperor ſhould ſtill reſiſt; ſhould bring freſh armies into the field, and again threaten Italy, the high value which the Directory attach to his ſeparation from England, will produce a renewal of the offer of indemnity at the expence of ſome of the Germanic ſtates.

In either caſe, the French Regency will have ſucceeded in conſiderably weakening the firſt power in Germany, and in ſcattering the ſeeds of diſcord among all the Princes of the empire. They rely on the real or artificial terror with which they have inſpired the cabinets of the ſecondary ſtates; they rely on the jealouſy and miſtruſt which daily encreaſe between the members of that vaſt body, now reduced to a ſtate of anarchy; they rely on the ambition of the Princes devoted to Pruſſia; on the deſign imputed to that power of profiting by the chaos for the enforcement of certain obſolete claims, and for extending the activity of the ſyſtem of *participation*; they rely on the rupture which ſuch deſigns muſt produce between Auſtria and Pruſſia, and on the general commotion

commotion that will enſue; they rely on the inactivity of the new Emperor of Ruſſia; on that general ſyſtem of policy ſo worthy of the age, which limits the ſenſe of real danger entertained by each ſeparate power to that to which ſuch power is perſonally expoſed; and his idea of the ſafety of Europe to that kind of ſecurity which ſome few ſtates will ſtill be permitted to preſerve for ſome few days; they rely upon the vacillations of ſo many fluctuating courts, which never have harboured one grand thought; they rely on the creatures which the Revolution has procured for them in ſuch courts, either by the influence of certain ſectaries, or by a dread of the future, which repreſents fear as the only ſhield againſt a peril of which Princes and their Miniſters have never dared to calculate the extent, acknowledge the certainty, or recognize the principle; nor againſt which have they even dared to point out the neceſſary preſervatives; they rely on the weakneſs of Sovereigns ſurrounded by Miniſters, the ſtandard of whoſe abilities is exhibited in the preſent ſituation of Europe; they rely on thoſe inteſtine cabals which divide courts, and confine their attention to far different objects than a ſyſtem of general policy; they rely on their own multiplied intrigues, which infeſt every country, on the poiſon which they diffuſe, on their

agents

agents and accomplices, and on thoſe corruptions, the rates of which are ſtuck upon the walls of the Luxembourg; they rely on that longing after peace, proclaimed even on the firſt day of the war, which is a ſymptom of the failure of all courage, of all reaſon, of all public ſpirit, propagated with indefatigable induſtry, and in the clamours of which the conſpirators, the factious, the revolutioniſts of all countries join, forming an echo to the egotiſts, and to thoſe people who have not had reſolution to defend themſelves;—laſtly, they rely on the ravages produced by their doctrines, on the conſternation diffuſed by their crimes, on the admiration excited by their arms, which leads every blockhead to laud the miracles of legiſlative wiſdom, and the copious ſtreams of happineſs which it will ſhower down on—*poſterity*.

Theſe, ſir, are the numerous and potent allies of the renovators of the human race; they ſurround Kings, Miniſters, and Regencies; they put a bandage before their eyes, while they prepare, by ſtimulating their paſſions, the ſubverſion of their authority, and the place for their ſcaffold.

The Southern part of Europe ſubjugated, Germany diſmembered, a prey moreover to inteſtine diviſions and civil wars, in the midſt of which

the revolution will firſt place her machines, and ſoon after her ſtandards, the Emperor reduced by force to the neceſſity of abandoning his only ally, the Directory will turn all their thunder againſt England. On that conſtitution which acts as an inceſſant ſatire on the democratic extravagancies of the French Conventions—on the King of a *free* nation—on a ſtate more rich, more induſtrious, more flouriſhing, than modern France—on that receptacle of ſo many treaſures—on that power whoſe weight ſtill ſerves to ballaſt the continent—they have reſolved to inflict a mortal blow. It is abſurd to ſuppoſe that the deſire of recovering a few colonies will ever inſpire the French Government with an idea of peace. They have devoted the Antilles to deſolation—they have covered them with a crowd of deſperate banditti—they are leſs anxious to regain what they have loſt, than to reduce that whole Archipelago to aſhes.

And, on this head, they play almoſt a ſure game: for the duration of the war authorizes the eſtabliſhment of the revolutionary ſyſtem in the colonies, ſanctions the rage of equality, and juſtifies the deſtruction of property. Peace, in a few years, would produce the ſame effect: for the colonial ſyſtem of the Republic continuing

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to ſubſiſt* after the war, they will ſoon have converted the iſlands into ſtreams of blood and heaps of ruins, as they have already converted Saint Domingo. As well might the colonies be thrown into the ſea, as abandoned to the conſequences of the French revolution, on the faith of a treaty of peace.

The Republic wiſhes to remain at war with Great Britain, iſolated and abandoned by the continent; but, conſcious of her inability, for a great length of time, to balance the naval power of England, ſhe relies, with a degree of confidence that perceptibly increaſes every day, on the complication of inſtruments which ſhe has ſubſtituted in the place of fleets. France has ſucceeded in waging the moſt dreadful of all wars againſt her rival, by excluding her from the coaſts of the ocean, and of the Mediterranean. But this excluſion is ſtill incomplete: Portugal, Naples, Venice, Trieſte, and the North of Germany, are ſtill open to the Britiſh commerce; and the Directorial Councils of Paris are now employed in deviſing means for cloſing theſe avenues. We have juſt witneſſed one attempt of the kind

* See the excellent Tracts on this ſubject lately publiſhed by M. Malouet.

againſt Hamburgh and the Hanſeatic Towns. Thoſe who flatter themſelves that theſe ports, being protected by the line of demarcation, are ſecure againſt a renewal of the attempt, ought immediately to think of the means of averting it: for if the demand ſhould be repeated, and the affairs of Europe ſhould continue in the ſame direction which they have lately taken, will they dare, in ſix months from this time, to refuſe any ſacrifice to a power which rules from the confines of Naples to the mouth of the Ems, and which no longer admits of any bounds to the condeſcenſion of other ſtates?—The invaſion of the Southern part of Italy is about to exclude the Engliſh from the Mediterranean. The King of Naples and the Senate of Venice will undoubtedly be required to imitate the conduct of Genoa and Leghorn; the treaty of peace, *purchaſed* for fifteen millions tournois, by the firſt of theſe Sovereigns, and the neutrality of the ſecond, will not be ſuffered to exempt them from the neceſſity of obedience.—As to Portugal, her independence is ſtill ſecured by her own ſword and by the Engliſh fleets. There, at leaſt, the people will not proſtrate themſelves, without having fought, before the tyrants of Europe, nor before their auguſt ally, the Prince of Peace; they will defend themſelves againſt a yoke to which moſt

moſt of the European powers haſtened to bend their necks.

The conſequences of this ſtagnation of the maritime commerce of England upon her induſtry, her credit, her public revenue, and her internal repoſe, need only be indicated: the Directory have calculated them all. And while, by this means, they relax the main ſpring of Britiſh power, they inceſſantly attack, by a multiplicity of agents, intrigues, and exertions, the fidelity of the people and the ſtability of their laws; the ſpirit of party has enliſted under their banners, and poſſibly without intending it; one ſtep farther, and they will find themſelves in alliance with thoſe eighty thouſand Jacobins whoſe exiſtence has been proclaimed by Mr. *Burke*, and who are nothing more than eighty thouſand ſervants of the Directory. Who knows even, whether plots more active, more perſonal, will not be directed againſt the King and the principal members of the government? Is there a crime of which the propoſition, the examination, or the adoption, may not be daily found in the political ledger of the adminiſtrators of the republican revolution?

In ſhort, theſe clandeſtine manœuvres, this fatal infection, whoſe progreſs they ſtimulate, are the

the firſt parallels of a regular ſiege, which will be executed by the means of deſcents. It certainly never entered into the thoughts of the Directory to conquer England as William the Norman did. Their object is to ſpread deſolation and confuſion over that iſland. They hope, and not without reaſon, to rally around their ſtandards, when once fixed on Britiſh ground, all the banditti and incendiaries, all the rogues and diſturbers of public peace, all ambitious men who are deſtitute of morals, and the indigent who are averſe from the reſtraint of laws. Thoſe Iriſh *Defenders*, whom they juſtly call their *Brothers*; thoſe *Defenders*, whom General *Hoche*, in his proclamation, paints in the ſame colours that CATO OF UTICA employed to paint the Roman Senate, are nothing more than highwaymen, and thieves by profeſſion. The men of property in England, more enlightened, more attached to their country, than men of a ſimilar deſcription in other parts of Europe, have hitherto oppoſed an impenetrable phalanx to the revolutionary ſpirit of proſelytiſm; but can they look forward, without ſhuddering, to the time when a foreign army, commanded by Jacobins, and compoſed of the dregs of France, ſhall give the ſignal of revolt, and lend their ſupport to the multitude who have no property?

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To ruin the power of the Houſe of Auſtria, and to ſubvert England, are the two grand objects of the Directorial policy, at this moment. If they attain this object, even imperfectly, they think themſelves ſure of eaſily ſubduing the reſt of Europe.

And, in fact, do not experience, the ſpirit of the times, and hiſtorical evidence, authorize the experiment? Is it poſſible to conceive any adequate reſource againſt a power, at once legiſlator, conqueror, pontiff, and revolutioniſt, and who has been ſuffered to devour, piece-meal, more than one half of Europe, when the richeſt power, and the ſecond military monarchy ſhall have been forced, the one to purchaſe the ruins of her political exiſtence by the ſacrifice of her fineſt provinces, the other to open her boſom to French republicaniſm and to French pillage?

Will the ſtates that ſtill remain intire ſeek for their ſafety in a new league? Will they endeavour to reſiſt that fiery Coloſſus which, already maſter of the South and of the Weſt, will deſolate the North with his armies, or diſorganize it by its example? Can they hope to eſcape the fate of thoſe monarchies which they have ſeen expire with indifference, and perhaps with ſatisfaction?

faction? Will they make greater efforts, will they diſſipate more immenſe treaſures, will they ſecure themſelves more efficaciouſly againſt the contagion and diſcord that will be ſcattered among them, than the firſt coalition did?

Will they look for their ſafety in an alliance with the French Republic? But, what intereſt will ſuch an union offer them, where the empires againſt whom it might be neceſſary will be either worn out, conquered, or diſſolved? What will conſtitute the object and the bond of a ſimilar connection? Where will its guarantee be found, when the inequality of influence being no longer balanced by the equilibrium of Europe, all the allies of France muſt neceſſarily be left at the mercy of that immenſe Republic, raiſed to a ſituation of pre-eminence that will bid defiance to all attacks? Who will defend thoſe governments which ſhall be ſo imprudent as to reſign themſelves to the embraces of the tiger? who ſhall defend them againſt his inconſtancy, his inevitable rapine, his inſults, his *organizators*, and his opinions?

I am aware, ſir, that anſwers are found to an experimental leſſon of ſix years; palliatives are diſcovered for all dangers, and ſoporifics as a remedy

remedy for terror in fantaſtical repreſentations, formed at a diſtance, on the nature of the French government, on the character of its leaders, on the hypocriſy diſplayed in their ſpeeches, and on the diſſimulation which occaſionally marks their policy.

Alas! ſuch errors as theſe have led Europe on from precipice to precipice. Aſſuredly, in 1791, and even in 1793, the Venetians as little ſuſpected, as the Emperor of Ruſſia now ſuſpects, that the armed revolution would reach their doors.

Yet I know nothing more immutable than the doctrine and the object of the French revolutioniſts, ſince the year 1792. It is in the power of every man to convince himſelf of this fact, if, inſtead of founding his opinions on a mode of reaſoning as moveable as the circumſtances which give riſe to it, on ſophiſms dictated by the paſſions, and on the reports of gazetteers, he would coolly and ſteadily reflect on the facts, on the regular chain of facts, that occur every day.

From the firſt hour of its exiſtence, it was a principle of the Jacobin ſyſtem, not to acknowledge any other government in Europe, than ſuch

as was founded on the ſovereignty of the people, and on abſolute equality, and to purſue, to deſtruction, all ſtates that were erected on a different baſis.

This principle was paſſed into a *law* by the National Convention in the month of December, 1792. That law has never been revoked, nor has its revocation even been propoſed:—It has remained as a revolutionary pharos in the midſt of the affected obſcurities of an accidental Machiaveliſm. Wherever the Republic has carried her arms, conſolidated her conqueſts, or extended her influence, ſhe has preſcribed her own political inſtitutions, which now prevail from the Zuiderzee to the Tiber. In their inflexible dignity, the chiefs of this new religion, when called upon to treat with Monarchical or Ariſtocratical powers, have exacted from them a formal acknowledgement of their own conſtitution, and particularly of their legiſlative acts; but without according a reciprocal conceſſion, by a retractation of the decree to which I have adverted. It is not in vain titles, in inſignificant protocols, that the Republic places its ſovereignty; its chiefs have given up without trouble what etiquette and the neceſſity of negociating did not permit them to refuſe; but, by the ſide of theſe formal ſubſcriptions, every year,

year, every month, they have repeated the ſenatorial imprecations againſt the illegality of all monarchical principles; proclamations, and acts the moſt deſtructive of the authority of all ſovereigns; and oaths of hatred to Royalty; exhibiting a permanent conſpiracy againſt every ſyſtem foreign from equality and from French liberty.

It is the invariable doctrine of the Jacobins, that their *moral force* depends excluſively on the extenſion of their ſyſtem to the reſt of Europe; they have neither abandoned nor concealed for a moment that centre of conſpiracy, it is written in every page of their hiſtory, as in the code of their ſecret committees.

And when I ſpeak of *Jacobins*, I do not mean to deſignate that crew of ſubaltern miſcreants and journeymen aſſaſſins, who are known by the name of *Terroriſts*; but the appellation applies to thoſe who gave birth to the ſyſtem; to the men who founded, who maintain, and who govern the Republic.

Now the government is ſtill, and more than ever, in the hands of the Jacobins. Majorities in the Councils, unanimity in the Directory, the ſprings of power, the ſources of influence, of

terror, and corruption; they retain all theſe, and by the authority of the *law* itſelf.

In particular, they have monopolized the right of deciſion, of adminiſtration, in ſhort, an excluſive authority, in all matters of external or foreign policy. Neither the nation, nor any claſs of the nation, its aſſemblies, its electors, nor its adminiſtrators, participate, either directly or indirectly, in the power of making peace or war, or of forming alliances with foreign powers. France, *free*, the very prototype of all liberty, and a Republic not to be equalled, is excluded, by the conſtitution of 1795, not only from the right, but even from all legal poſſibility, of influencing, even by ſimple petitions, the determination of the important queſtions of war or peace. Were four-fifths of the inhabitants pertinaciouſly bent on obtaining either one or the other, they have no means of enforcing a compliance with their requiſition, but by inſurrection.

The foreſight of the Jacobins eſtabliſhed this uſurpation, which the inattention, the terror, and the laſſitude of the public have conſecrated. On the one hand, they have left the Directory the right of providing, *according to the laws, for the external ſafety of the ſtate*; (that is to ſay, arbitrarily,

rily, for they are ſubject to no reſtrictions, in this reſpect, either of law or of form;) the right of commencing hoſtilities; and the moſt extenſive power with regard to the opening of negociations. On the other hand, *the law conſtrains* every citizen to give his ſervices, his property, his life, and his talents, whenever the *country* requires them; which ſignifies, in the vulgar tongue, that the Directory have the right to require, whenever they pleaſe, and that in the moſt unlimited ſenſe, the fortunes and lives of the inhabitants, for the ſupport of their enterprizes. The ſecondary adminiſtrations are charged with the execution of theſe requiſitions; but the Directory being authorized to ſuſpend and diſmiſs the adminiſtrators, in an arbitrary manner, and without being reſponſible for their conduct, the latter are in fact *their* clerks, and not thoſe of the nation.

Obſerve, moreover, that perſons of property, having no preference in the national repreſentation, and being, neceſſarily, left in a minority, ſince the whole multitude, if they can read and write, are admitted to chuſe the Electors, war, under ſuch a ſyſtem, will become habitual; for the governors having a fortune to make, and creatures to provide for, will alſo have a thouſand motives for inceſſantly involving the Republic in hoſtilities.

hoſtilities. To a government compoſed of men of property, peace is neceſſary, as well as its companions, economy, moderate impoſts, ſtability and ſecurity. To a government of poor, greedy, vain, and ambitious democrats, perpetual wars are neceſſary. The fact is proved by hiſtory: and French policy, ſince the Revolution, proves it ſtill better than hiſtory.

Let not Europe, then, abandon herſelf to any illuſion on this head. So long as this ſyſtem ſhall ſubſiſt, it will always have a war at its command; at one time for the private intereſts of its governors, who will invariably give a foreign direction to inteſtine diſcontents and commotions; at another, from the nature of a political ſociety, which muſt, neceſſarily, become tumultuous, if ſome national danger, or extraordinary power, do not inceſſantly interfere to ſuſpend civil convulſions. Now, as all public danger, in an indiviſible aſſociation of thirty millions of EQUALS, calls for the aſſiſtance of a deſpotic authority; the perſons entruſted with the government will not ſuffer the pretext for exerciſing ſuch power to eſcape; and they will exerciſe it with the greater certainty, becauſe, as they are uſurpers who are both hated and envied, and reign on the brink of a precipice, it will be their firſt care to fix the attention

tention of the nation on any other object than their liberty.

Such is the vital principle of the preſent war, and the ſecret cauſe of the inveteracy with which the Directory, and their accomplices, perpetuate it, in the midſt of bankruptcy, famine, the deſtruction of credit, the groans and fears of the people, and public calamities.

The conſequences of a peace, ſigned at the commencement of the year 1796, after the brilliant ſucceſſes of MARESCHAL CLERFAYE, when Italy was yet untouched, and the French armies were haraſſed, exhauſted, and diſcontented; at a time when the Aſſignats had totally diſappeared, when the arms of the Allies had recovered their ſplendour, and the majority of the Germanic Body ſtill followed the ſtandards of the Emperor; when the Convention, loaded with public execration, had juſt, by proroguing itſelf, given freſh vigour to public reſentment; at the moment of a tranſition from a ſtate of unbridled deſpotiſm to a frail and novel conſtitution, the conſequences of a peace concluded then, can bear no analogy with thoſe of the pacification to which Europe is about to be condemned. Her conſequence, her power, her fineſt provinces, the balance of her ſtrength,

all

all bend before a committee of triumphant Regicides, who have attained their object;—that of dictating the law, in order to ſecure the power of acknowledging no power but their own; that of preſcribing the terms of peace, in order to renew the war, without having to fear the chaſtiſement of their infidelity.

Your Excellence will eaſily anticipate the language, and the conduct which will reſult from ſuch a ſtate of things. Europe will be treated, as a diſtinguiſhed writer* has very juſtly obſerved, as the Revolutioniſts of 1789 treated the unhappy Louis the XVIth:—"*They made him diſmiſs his troops and retained their own.*" The ſmalleſt umbrage will become a ſubject of litigation and rupture; a reſtleſs and factious policy will have conſtantly at its command a manufactory of miſtruſt and complaints. Wherever a ſovereign ſhall adopt a precaution, the Directory will deſcry an act of hoſtility. All the partizans of mutiny and diſaffection in Europe will rely upon Paris, as upon *the great committee of general inſurrection.* That committee will ſee, or pretend to ſee, *conſpiracies* in any repreſſive meaſure of police, to which a regard

* See an intereſting work of M. de Montloſier, entitled "*Summary Views on the Means of Peace.*"

for

for their own ſafety may force foreign governments to adopt; every diſpute with their ſubjects, every contention among themſelves, will be brought before this regency of the *univerſe*, ſupreme arbiter of all claims, protector of all poſſeſſions, judge of all differences, and who will take into their pay all the elements of war, diſorder, and revolution, from one extremity of Europe to the other.

Aſſuredly no monarch, and probably no miniſter nor magiſtrate out of France, has ſubmitted to read, much leſs to ſtudy, the conſtitution of 1795. This preſumption is ſuggeſted by the opinion which has been generally formed of this new *chef-d'œuvre* of the political infancy of France; and a *chef-d'œuvre*, which might be deſcribed in a ſingle line, by calling it *a means of allying, with the forms of liberty, the neceſſity, the combination, and the force of deſpotiſm.*

The national repreſentation, weakened in its principle, by an extenſion of territory; in its mode, by the nature, rapidity, and ſcale of the elections, is only placed there to ſerve as a mark for tyranny. A Directory, iſolated from the nation, and almoſt independent of the legiſlature; legiſlative councils, chained to that Directory by a ſimilarity of ſituation, of intereſt, and of paſſions; deputies, abſolute ſtrangers to their conſtituents;

ſtituents; too poor to diſpenſe with ſalaries, too new, and too great novices, not to be eternally ſubjugated by the intrigues, the immorality, and the aſcendancy of the capital; electors who muſt be paid for their ſcrutiny at the rate of *three livres* per head per diem; the whole adminiſtration removeable at the will of the ſupreme regency; a right of requiſition unlimited; all the attributes of power vague and indeterminate; the inefficient rights left to the nation, circumſcribed and fettered; add to this a war, which puts all the citizens in the barracks, in the camps, or on the government's regiſters of recruits, which authorizes the moſt arbitrary meaſures, and which empties every man's purſe; ſuch is the compoſition of that Republic, *one and indiviſible*, which, adding a few hundreds more of ſquare leagues to its *indiviſibility*, runs, of its own accord, into the embraces of deſpotiſm, without which a ſociety of thirty millions of *equals* would be nothing more than a charnel-houſe.

But this deſpotiſm, exerciſed by uſurpers, who will ſtill totter for a long time, and who will ſucceed each other in virtue of the law itſelf, will want to keep itſelf in breath, and to employ abroad the volcanic activity of ſuch an aggregation, in a nation as warlike as it is turbulent; as enamoured of vain-glory as of novelty.

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This *primum mobile* of perturbation and danger to Europe would become a ſcourge to any government whatever; what will it be, then, when it ſhall receive additional activity from philoſophical fanaticiſm, and from the calculation of perſonal ſafety, which makes the founders of the French Republic feel the neceſſity, and inſpires them with the deſign, of aſſociating all Europe in their plan of general renovation.

Theſe truths, ſir, are not the offspring of my imagination; they are written in the book of experience, and in the hiſtory of the times. If I were to be told of the tranſitory benevolence which the Directory may poſſibly have diſplayed to ſome ſtates, of their hypocritical declarations and deluſive promiſes, I would open the annals of the day, and aſk, whether the government I have depicted, be not the ſame that has made the arrogance of Louis the XIVth and of Louvois, be forgotten; that negociates with the tone of command; that receives, rejects, diſmiſſes, and inſults the repreſentatives of ſovereigns, while it exacts for its own the moſt exaggerated attention and reſpect? Whether it be not the ſame that, after having violated, in its conduct to the belligerent powers, all the laws of war and of nations, has diſplayed, in its treatment of the neutral powers, contempt, ingratitude, a violation of all

juſtice, of public and private property, of treaties, of independence, and of that good faith which is reciprocally due from one ſovereign ſtate to another? If it be not the ſame that, inſulting the United States of America, to which gratitude, regard for the public opinion, and political relations, preſcribed every kind of regard, has endeavoured, and ſtill endeavours, to deſolate America by a ſecond revolution, to inflame civil diſcord, and to ſurround the virtuous Waſhington with dangers and diſguſt?

Whether it be not the ſame that ſtimulated Spain to an invaſion of Portugal, to the commiſſion of an act of monſtrous ingratitude, in order to puniſh that power for having ſupplied CHARLES THE THIRD with the contingency of troops ſtipulated by the treaty of 1778, a contingency that was withdrawn as ſoon as peace was concluded;—and the ſupply of which conſtituted the ſole act by which Portugal took any ſhare in the preſent war?

If it be not the ſame government that, in return for the confidence, the advances, the aſſiſtance, the anxious devotion invariably diſplayed by the Genoeſe from its firſt origin, has eſtabliſhed a dictatorſhip in their capital, paid a ſet of miſcreants who labour to ſubvert their government, taken poſſeſ-

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ſion of their fortreſſes, their ports, and their arſenals; ſubjected them to a tribute, the ſecond payment of which has been recently demanded before the firſt has been completed, and in violation of the ſolemn treaty by which the Republic of Genoa, relying on the promiſe of the Directory, thought to put an end to its exactions?

If it be not the ſame, that treats the Venetians like ſubjects, their provinces like Belgium, the property of their citizens like objects of requiſition, and their government like a tributary—compelled every moment to purchaſe an exemption from extortion and danger, by enormous gratifications to the commiſſaries and to the directorial treaſury?

If it be not the ſame that has rewarded the Grand Duke of Tuſcany for his haſte to become neuter, and for the promptitude of his ſubmiſſion, by ſeizing Leghorn, with its trade, and a part of its capital; and by conſidering that prince as a kind of ſecretary, charged with regiſtering the will of the French in the Duchy of Tuſcany?

If it be not the ſame, that has reduced the Swiſs to ſuch a ſituation that they no longer dare even

even diſcuſs its pretenſions, reject any of its complaints, or aſſume, in reſpect to itſelf, any other tone than that of patience, which is juſtified by all the examples which we ſee around us?—If it be not the ſame, in ſhort, that, having ſeized on the fortreſſes of Piedmont, and impoſed on the ſovereign of the country a treaty, which ought to be ſacred from its very nature, arms againſt that unhappy prince conſpirators and rebels; and, after having deſpoiled him of his ſtates, farther ſeeks to deſpoil him of his authority?

Whatever ſome viſionary writers may aſſert, if a league of *public good* were now to preſent itſelf, with the avowed project of reſtoring the French Monarchy, and with the promiſe of eſtabliſhing a wiſe, moderate, and paternal government, it would no longer be liſtened to by a nation that feels its own ſtrength, and is too proud to receive advice, or even benefits, at the point of the bayonet. It is no longer then, I repeat the queſtion, whether there ſhall be a monarchy or a republic in France, that ought to decide the conduct of any of the cabinets of Europe; it is the danger to which all governments, all lawful authorities, all religious worſhip, property, public credit, commerce, the arts and ſciences, and every thing which conduces to the harmony and the charm

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of human ſociety are expoſed; it is that danger which calls for other cures than thoſe of worldly pleaſure, or diplomatic chicanery.

France which, having aſſerted her own independence, deſtroys or threatens that of other ſtates; France which, far from ſatisfied with inflicting the revolutionary ſcourge on thirty millions of men, aſpires to extend it, under the protecting influence of her banners, to either hemiſphere; France which, ſword in hand, ſeeks to ſubject the univerſe to the ſovereignty of the people, to the rights of man, to abſolute equality, and to a contempt for the divinity, makes her generals proclaim theſe dogmas which are ſubverſive of all moral order among men; *that* France points out to nations their perils, and to governments their duties.

While they are diſputing on the benches, whether France will remain under the power of the Jacobins, or of the Moderates, of the Republicans of this or of that æra; while augurs ſeek, in ſtreams of ink, leſs fatidical than the flight of birds, the horoſcope of monarchies and of republics, Totila marches to the Capitol; armies have wings, and policy creeps in the dark.

A few changes in the obliterated theſes which France calls her *laws* would moſt probably produce

duce no alteration, either in the internal or external ſyſtem of the Republic. That ſyſtem preceded the law; it made the law for its own preſervation; it rules the law, and the law every moment ſubmits to the inflictions which it impoſes.

To this ſyſtem, and to its adminiſtrators, ſtill belong the excluſive faculty and power of reforming the conſtitution; now, they never will reform it ſo as to weaken the authority which it ſecures to themſelves; or to thwart the exerciſe of ſuch authority either at home or abroad.

The independence and the repoſe of Europe are inſeparably connected with the return of the French nation to a ſpirit of order and tranquillity, to its natural genius, to ideas of public juſtice, and real liberty. Can ſo glorious a revolution be expected from the authors of the revolution of 1792, from the legatees of all the crimes and all the extravagancies which preceded and which cemented the Republic? Can it be expected from the ſituation in which thoſe men have placed themſelves, or from their perſonal characters? Will remorſe and a diſintereſted patriotiſm ſucceed to neceſſary paſſions, to a forced ambition, and to fears which no human power can now remove? Will a government either compoſed of, or allied with, Jacobins, and

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conſtrained to humour them as the ſupport of a ſyſtem which, left to the management of its chiefs, would reſolve itſelf into a popular chaos or a limited monarchy—Will ſuch a government realize the parable of the *old man* and the reign of Auguſtus?

Thoſe men are certainly of too credulous a diſpoſition, who, like the Repreſentative DUMAS, believe that the paſſions are to be lulled aſleep as eaſily as the Croats are to be vanquiſhed, and who, miſtaking for a dream of terror, that experience which M. Neckar ſo juſtly denominates *white-haired*, undertake to quiet the apprehenſions of Europe, excited by the revolutionary conqueſts of France*.

Certainly I ſee very plainly the bed of roſes which M. DUMAS is preparing for us; but I alſo ſee the poniards of the Jacobins which form the teſter, and the genius of their government which ſtands centinel at the curtains. I ſee very plainly what he thinks, and what he deſires, as well as thoſe who eſpouſe his opinions; but, unfortunately, their wiſhes are not authorities. Unable to reſiſt the deſpotiſm that prevails, invoking peace merely becauſe their adverſaries

* See an ingenious work publiſhed by M. DUMAS, under the title of "*Conſequences of the laſt Campaign*," &c.

aſpire to prolong the war, where is the guarantee of their promiſes, what are the means of realizing them?

We know very well that, by eclipſing the men who, for four years, have exerciſed over their country the pontificate of malevolence, that by replacing them with Republicans who are diſciples of *Phocion*, of *Cato*, or of *John Adams*, or with monarchiſts wiſe enough to extricate liberty from the ruins in which ſhe is buried, by aſſociating her with the regal power, balanced not enſlaved, we ſhould eſtabliſh the public welfare; aſſuredly in that caſe, the return of peace, the reſpect due to nations, and their ſovereigns, public faith, the vanity of conqueſts, and a ſpirit of moderation, would cloſe this career of calamity.

But this event is, perhaps, beyond the reach of human power. The doctoral deliberations of the *youths* and the *elders*, the electoral ſcrutiny, the conſpiracies of Bedlam, the factious counter-revolutioniſts, their patrons, and their promoters, will neither accelerate nor retard the inevitable moment.

It is now ſubjected to Providence, to time, to the neceſſary courſe of folly and experience, to that irreſiſtible force of ſocial intereſt which never permits

permits eternity of evil, nor allows a durable triumph to the works of the wicked.

But during the ſlow conſummation of this tardy buſineſs, the tempeſt purſues its courſe. Will it ſpare Europe when inattentive and diſarmed? It may perhaps be diſpelled, in a few years, in the place of its birth; but will it not firſt have deſolated the countries over which it has paſſed?

God ſend that certain ſtates, blinded by the ſucceſſes of injuſtice, and ambitious to partake of them, may not be preparing freſh ſcenes of deſolation. The chaſtiſement is ready; the revolution, which ſpares not its accomplices any more than its victims, will take charge of that.

I ſhall now conclude, ſir, having already ſaid too much for a mind ſo enlightened as yours. After having demonſtrated the dangers which reſult to all Europe from a revolutionary government turned conqueror; and from a military power, which has an advantage over other powers, derived from the double force of its principles and its conqueſts; I will not affirm, that theſe dangers would be averted by a continuation of the war. It is time to acknowledge, that where there exiſts an impoſſibility of re-eſtabliſh-

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ſing concert in plans, and vigour in the cabinet and in the field, reſourſe muſt be had to other means of ſafety.

Here the moſt imperative conſiderations unite to call for the intervention of all the neutral powers; however their intereſt, well or ill underſtood, may have deterred them from taking any part in the war, their poſitive intereſt now calls them to diſcuſs the conditions of peace; and it is by their influence, and even by the intervention of their forces, that while ſuch ſacrifices are made to the French Republic as circumſtances render neceſſary, ſhe may ſtill be compelled to forego her projects of univerſal ruin and devaſtation—there are no hopes of ſafety, then, ſo long as Europe ſhall remain in that ſtate of diviſion, conflict, and ſelfiſhneſs, in which we ſee it plunged. No hopes of ſafety, unleſs all the great powers unite to facilitate the concluſion of a moderate peace which may reſcue Europe from the diſhonour of becoming the feudatory of the revolution, and the patrimony of its actors.

There is not a moment to be loſt, the time of repentance approaches, while the hour of preſervation as rapidly recedes.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.